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During the Cold War and the ongoing Global War On Terrorism, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan formed the strongholds of mujahedeen- 
turned terrorists. For the last four decades, the tribespeople of FATA have been the 
victims of terror and socio-economic deprivation. The tribal traditions and the semi-
autonomous status of FATA—in accordance with the constitution of Pakistan—barred 
Pakistan’s administration from imposing any order in the FATA. In the absence of any 
real law enforcement and governance mechanism in FATA, the Taliban thrived—and 
exported terror to the outside world.  
After 9/11, amid international pressure, Pakistan’s government endeavored to 
establish its writ in FATA. As part of this process, Pakistan’s Army drove the Taliban 
from FATA through a decade-long military campaign. Now, to ensure peace, stability, 
and prosperity in the region, Pakistan must integrate FATA into the national mainstream 
by imposing the full constitutional framework on the lawless region.  
This thesis examines the integration options available to Pakistan to absorb FATA 
into its national system and examines the possibility of merging FATA with Khyber 
Pakhtun Khaw province—which has significant ethnic, religious, and cultural 
similarities, though it has been part of Pakistan’s federal system for 70 years. 
Specifically, this thesis highlights the administrative and economic reforms necessary to 
establish effective state control and to bring the FATA to equal status with Pakistan’s 
other provinces.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rugged, mountainous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) lie along 
the Durand Line–Afghanistan border in northwest Pakistan. The FATA hosts Pashtu-
speaking tribes who follow a social system based on tribal traditions and customs. The 
FATA has a population of approximately 4.2 million1 in an area of 27,220 square 
kilometers, thus accounting for 1.6 percent of Pakistan’s total population and 3.4 percent 
of the state’s total area.2 And yet, FATA is separate from the rest of Pakistan, with a 
semi-autonomous status that exempts FATA from much of Pakistan’s legal and 
governmental institutions.  
The uncontrolled tribal lands of Pakistan have retained an independent or semi-
independent status for centuries. During the colonial era, the British did not invest serious 
military or diplomatic efforts in assimilating the tribal areas or bringing them under the 
central control of the British Indian Empire in India; London was more interested in 
maintaining a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and British India.3 The regulations 
that outlined this arrangement between FATA and the central authorities passed to 
Pakistan when the British Raj came to an end in 1947. 
Since the sub-continent’s partition and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, amid 
numerous security and economic challenges, Pakistan has continued the British legacy in 
the management of the tribal areas.4 Specifically, the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan 
continued the traditional semi-autonomous status in FATA,5 partly because of the 
                                                 
1 “FATA Sustainable Return and Rehabilitation Strategy,” United Nations Development Program, 
March 2015, 7, accessed June 11, 2016, http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/
crisis_prevention_and_recovery/fata-sustainable-return-and-rehabilitation-strategy-.html.  
2 Umbreen Javaid, “FATA a Breeding Ground of Extremism in Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies 
18 (2011): 174, accessed May 24, 2016, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/FATA%20-
%2010.pdf. 
3 Olaf K. Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 (New York: MacMillan; St Martin’s Press, 1990), 
accessed April 20, 2016, http://apnaorg.com/books/english/the-pathans/the-pathans.pdf. 
4 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ed., Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamabad 
Policy Research Institute, 2005).  
5 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Part XII, Chapter 3: Tribal Areas” 
Government of Pakistan, February 2012, accessed July 24, 2016, http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/
documents/1333523681_951.pdf.  
 2
demands of the local population and its leadership. FATA’s semi-autonomy has attracted 
outlaws and terrorist groups from all over Pakistan who have found refuge and 
established illegal businesses through criminal rackets. Under the patronage of the 
Taliban, such illicit businesses as drug trafficking, weapons dealing, smuggling of 
contraband, and abductions for ransoms have thrived; Taliban factions have extracted 
money from such criminal enterprises to pursue their terror objectives. 
Tensions in Afghanistan, just over the border, have exacerbated this situation. 
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Taliban allegedly used FATA as well as eastern 
Afghanistan as safe havens for training and re-fitment as well as for a convenient hideout 
for its leadership. Then in 2013–2014, amid intense Pakistani military operations in 
FATA areas, the leadership of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fled to Afghanistan from 
FATA. In retaliation, the TTP masterminded the 2014 massacre of the school at 
Peshawar, killing more than 150 students. The special status of FATA, currently without 
a central governing system, may be contributing to the region’s instability, resulting in 
militancy and terrorism, in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 9/11, in the absence of central or unified control by the government of 
Pakistan, FATA has been home to such terrorist organizations as Al Qaeda and TTP. The 
prevailing security environment in the tribal areas and ungoverned spaces on the Afghan 
side of the Durand Line has created a security dilemma for Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, in the neighboring province of Khyber Pakhtun Khaw (KPK), which shares 
ethnic, religious, and cultural similarities with FATA but which is completely assimilated 
into the federal structure of Pakistan, peace and stability prevail, and the outlook for the 
future of KPK is good. 
This thesis asks: How can Pakistan’s federal government bring FATA under more 
central or unified control? Does the extension of KPK’s administrative and economic 
model for FATA provide a way forward for FATA’s integration into Pakistan’s national 
system? Specifically, which administrative reforms—in governance, politics, and the 
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judiciary—and economic restructurings should be enforced to thwart terrorists operating 
in FATA and to promote stability in the region? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
After 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) forced the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda operatives out of Afghanistan—to re-establish their strongholds in FATA of 
Pakistan. In 2005, the Pakistan Army commenced military operations to eradicate 
terrorist sanctuaries in FATA. After a decade-long military operation, in 2015, Pakistan 
claimed to have re-established its writ in FATA, though at a heavy cost that included 
approximately 80,000 military and civilians deaths,6 besides 3.7 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) from FATA.7 In addition to the human cost, the financial cost 
has been approximately US$118 billion.8 At present, to restore social cohesion in FATA 
and to stop the re-emergence of violence, the Pakistani government has constituted 
various committees to formulate draft reforms.9 It is crucial to prioritize the 
examination—and the decision—on draft reforms for FATA while the army is deployed 
there. The secure and protected environment that the military presence in the FATA 
provides is crucial to the installation and success of a civilian-lead administrative support 
mechanism along with the necessary infrastructure for both the local tribes and 
government institutions. The time is now for taking the local tribal populace aboard and 
involving the denizens of FATA in the formulation and implementation of the reform 
package.  
A myth exists that the tribes of FATA have resisted modernity and development. 
In my opinion, during the past two centuries, there has been no real effort, either by 
                                                 
6 “Body Count: Casuality Figures after 10 years,” Physicians for Global Survival, New York, March 
2015, 82, accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/
Body_Count_first_international_edition_2015_final.pdf. 
7 “FATA Sustainable Return and Rehabilitation Strategy,” 19.  
8 “Report of the Committee on FATA Reforms 2016 FATA,” Ministry of State and Frontier Regions, 
Government of Pakistan, August 2016, 1, accessed October 20, 2016, http://202.83.164.29/safron/
userfiles1/file/Report%20of%20the%20Committee%20on%20FATA%20Reforms%202016%20final.pdf.  
9 “Prime Minister Sets Up Committee for Legal Reforms,” News International, December 1, 2015, 
accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/77981-pm-sets-up-committee-for-legal-
reforms.  
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London or, subsequently, by Islamabad to integrate FATA into any central or provincial 
governance system. After 9/11 and the GWOT, obvious threats have emanated from 
ungoverned FATA that have posed serious challenges to the security and stability of 
Pakistan. Amid these threats, Pakistan’s political and military elite has concluded that the 
establishment of law and order in FATA is crucial for attainment of stability. The 
integration of FATA under a modern governing system may contribute significantly to 
the attainment of enduring peace not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan but in the world as 
a whole. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A comprehensive study of scholarly sources on the tribal areas of Pakistan shows 
that the available literature is primarily descriptive. The relevant literature reflects the 
nature of relations between the tribes and the ruling elites of Kabul and Kandahar in the 
west and Delhi and Lahore in the east, from the 16th to the 20th centuries. For example, 
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an edited 
collection of three descriptive essays, explains FATA’s historical perspective through 
9/11. Cheema’s piece reflects the geography, history, absence of political system, and 
shortcomings of governance apparatus in FATA; he also indicates the fallout of the 
Soviet-Afghan War and its subsequent impact on neighboring FATA and rise of the 
Taliban, besides evolving present day conditions in FATA.10 Cheema explains the 
conditions that existed and determined the relations between the tribes of FATA, and the 
British, rulers of Afghanistan and, subsequently, Pakistan.  
Before the onset of the Cold War, a majority of literature discussing Pakistan’s 
tribal areas came from Western scholars, especially from the British who were then 
present in India as a colonial force. I will refer to Olaf Caroe’s book, The Pathans, and 
similar work on the subject.11 Caroe highlights that for foreign powers, the mountain 
passes became the key attraction to secure passage in the terrain of FATA.12 Through the 
                                                 
10 Cheema, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 
11 Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957. 
12 Ibid.  
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imposition of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in 1901, the British placed a 
mechanism of indirect control in tribal areas located around the mountain passes,13 and 
this interaction subsequently provided information about FATA to the rest of the world. 
The FCR mainly allowed the outside powers the right to use tracks around mountain 
passes; in their turn, tribal leaders derived material incentives as a monthly honorarium 
from the British.14 
Sana Haroon’s book, Frontiers of Faith, offers an in-depth analysis of the 18th 
century environment of FATA.15 She examines the impact of religious leaders on the 
organization and its transformation to religious hostility and intolerance in order to 
primarily guard against external influences. These phenomena, absent any governance 
and control mechanism, even prompted practices such as intolerance of other beliefs, at 
times, even contradictory to the basic faith of Islam.16 Olivier Roy has also indicated the 
similar phenomenon that promoted radical Islam to guard the nomadic traditions against 
contemporary social and political integration.17 The FATA tribes saw the Afghan and 
central Asian warriors attacking India, the British, Soviets, and lately the Americans, as 
potential threats to tribal order. To serve regional interests at a low cost, the religiously 
radicalized tribes of FATA were by design kept aloof from modernity and civilization, 
even at the dawn of the 21st century.18 
During the Cold War—especially with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan—
Pakistani and Western scholars found FATA more attractive for analysis.19 Steve Coll, in 
Ghost Wars, writes about the covert operations that the Central Intelligence Agency 
                                                 
13 “Choosing in Ungoverned Space: Pakistan’s Frontier Crimes Regulation,” University of San Diego, 
California, September 29, 2015, 2–3, accessed June 24, 2016, http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~arezaee/pdfs/
fcr_29sep2015.pdf.  
14 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the India-Afghan Borderland (London: Hurst & Company, 
2007), 23. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 66–68.  
17 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).  
18 Larry P. Goodson, “The New Great Game: Pakistan’s Approach to Afghanistan after 2014,” Asia 
Policy, 17 (January 2014): 34, accessed July 11, 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/536780/pdf.  
19 Here I am referring to the work of Olivier Roy, Sana Haroon, and Steve Coll besides many others. 
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(CIA) conducted during the 1980s, in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), inside Afghanistan and FATA.20 The CIA and ISI, 
through these covert operations funded, recruited, trained, and equipped the mujahedeen 
to contest Soviet forces that had invaded Afghanistan.21 The Soviets posed serious threats 
not only to the oil-rich Gulf, but to American interests in the Middle East, as well.  
Since 9/11 and the GWOT, many scholars have written extensively on 
Afghanistan and FATA. As Coll demonstrates, most of the literature has been a narration 
of past events that leads to an evaluation of the prevailing environment of lawlessness 
that breeds terror in FATA.22 However, the bulk of scholarly work does not provide the 
framework or measures that may contribute to needed central integration of FATA under 
a modern governance system. While most of the available literature highlights the bleak 
issues of FATA, this thesis endeavors to provide the framework to improve the socio-
economic situation of the FATA through imposition of constitutional reforms. 
Max Weber’s theory of state authority, applied to the contemporary FATA 
system, highlights the existing voids in the legal framework that, in turn, preclude the 
state’s “legitimate domination,” in Weber’s terminology.23 Weber believes that a state 
retains control over the use of authorized force within a given geographical space.24 He 
adds that people of a given territory provide legal, traditional, or charismatic authority to 
a state, and the state uses this authority through a governance mechanism.25 Weber 
categorizes state authority in three types: traditional domination, charismatic domination, 
and domination by virtue of legality.26 It is the rule of law and legal authority that 
promotes peace and democratic process in a society; whereas, for the last two centuries 
                                                 
20 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004).  
21 Coll, Ghost Wars, 119–124. 
22 Coll, Ghost Wars.  
23 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics,” ed. Patrick 
H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: Norton & Company, 2013), 35. 
24 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 32.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 35. 
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the nomadic culture in FATA has vested the authority in tribal chiefs—traditional 
domination. 
Olivier Roy writes in his book, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, that 
legitimacy in FATA traditionally has taken the form of tribal legacy and charismatic 
religious personalities without a formal legal contract.27 The absence of any legal 
domination, despite the presence of traditional and charismatic domination, deprived 
FATA of developing a formal governance system acceptable to the tribesmen. 
In a tribal or nomadic society, tradition has significant effects on behaviors and 
practices. The people’s attachment to nomadic practices results in resistance to any 
change, and hence people cling to the status quo despite evident benefits from new 
norms. Therefore, the inherent perception of freedom inbuilt freedom perception in 
nomadic society relegates the promised benefits linked with a formal state mechanism 
that apparently limits freedom of action. Prospect theory as explained by Kahneman and 
Tversky also supplements the reason for nomadic resistance to change and opposition to 
centralized state authority.28 Tribesmen discourage or reject any change that brings along 
certain losses, despite equal or greater possible benefits. The ancient nomadic culture and 
pride in tribal traditions hinder the socio-political evolutionary process among the 
tribesmen.  
Pashtunwali29 is the tribes’ code of conduct that includes ideas related to tribal 
identity and bondage. Charles Lindholm in his book, Segmentary Lineage System, opines 
that the society based on tribal traditions contests the idea of state supremacy over 
individual freedom.30 These segmentary tribal groups vest a single individual within a 
                                                 
27 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.  
28 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from 
Prospect Theory,” in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), 194–221. 
29 Pashtunwali: Pashtuns or Pathans follow a peculiar tribal tradition in their social interaction and for 
administration of justice. These tribal traditions have over time transformed as unwritten laws that are 
known and adhered to by all tribesmen in FATA.  
30 Charles Lindholm, “The Segmentary Lineage System: Its Applicability in Pakistan’s Political 
Structure,” in Pakistan Western Borderland: The Transformation of Political Order, ed. Ainslie T. Embree 
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977), 41–65.  
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hereditary system to decide their political, social, diplomatic, and religious leadership. At 
times, however, an additional individual, the mullah, is selected to lead in the religious 
domain. However, the patron of this theory’s application differs between nomadic and 
sedentary segmentary groups.31 The mountain-based nomadic groups have traditionally 
discouraged social interaction and are averse to change as compared to agriculturally 
based sedentary groups. Each group needs a different response option, though they may 
be similar in outlook.  
Ahmed Rashid’s volume, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in 
Central Asia,32 and Joshua T. White’s study, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic 
Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s North–West Frontier,33 note the ungoverned, if not 
ungovernable, environment in the tribal areas and also proffer policy options to address 
the issue astride the Durand Line.  
Both authors indicate policy fault lines in governance systems of the FATA: 
promotion of religious fundamentalism that transformed the mujahedeen into Taliban 
amid the Afghan Civil War34 and the emergence of sectarian violence under foreign 
influence of domestic and regional state and non-state stakeholders.35 These authors also 
advocate the transformation of administrative, political, economic, and judicial aspects of 
the governance system. White advocates reform in the development and political sector 
in FATA to improve the security situation.36  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The decade-long military operation in FATA has apparently created conditions 
for the enforcement of much needed socio-political reforms. The administrative and 
                                                 
31 Lindholm, “The Segmentary Lineage System: Its Applicability in Pakistan’s Political Structure,” 
43–45.  
32 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001).  
33 Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s 
North— West Frontier (Arlington: Center on Faith and International Affairs, 2008).  
34 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.  
35 White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier, 153. 
36 Ibid., 150–65.  
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economic reform will help the state of Pakistan to integrate FATA under its central 
control. For a counter-example, the KPK province—formerly the Northwestern Frontier 
Province—functions under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, which provides legal 
authority to administer the law. Despite KPK’s ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
similarities to FATA, the enforcement of constitutional and legal authority through a 
legitimate governance structure has significantly improved the socio-economic outlook of 
KPK. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis endeavors to highlight the method through which Pakistan must 
integrate legal authority with the traditional and charismatic-religious authority. This 
process must incorporate the tribal populace to evolve a multi-dimensional governance 
system.  
My research also examines the possibility of application of similar political and 
governance mechanisms in FATA already in practice in KPK. As the government needs 
to attain legal justification for the exercise of authority as advocated by Weber, this thesis 
analyzes the possibility of a referendum to inquire about the tribesmen’s intention to 
adopt a modern state system, and to replace the prevailing violent, radical nomadic order.  
This thesis suggests the basic contours of and a framework for a new reformed 
system for implementation in FATA to bring these areas under effective control of the 
state. The thesis also highlights the current administrative system—including governance, 
political, and judicial aspects—and economic system of FATA, beside recommending 
reforms in existing systems and a way forward for the integration of FATA into 
Pakistan’s state system.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter II introduces FATA from a historical perspective, analyzes the shaping of 
the prevailing environment, and also highlights the basic contours of the current FCR-
centric administrative, political, economic, and judicial mechanisms in FATA. Chapter 
III highlights FATA’s current administrative system, including its governance, political, 
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and judicial aspects. In Chapter III, I also address issues related to law and order, law 
enforcement, legislation, local government mechanism, and Jirga-based nomadic judicial 
system.  
Chapter IV of the thesis highlights the economic layout of FATA and explains 
how bureaucratic administration and the tribal elite of FATA conspired to manipulate the 
finances that led to the socio-economic deprivation of tribesmen of FATA. Chapter V of 
the thesis examines the existing administrative, political, economic, and judicial systems 
enforced in the KPK province of Pakistan. This chapter also highlights the existing 
systems of KPK within Pakistan’s constitutional framework, and identifies disparities 
between the living conditions of KPK’s residents and those in FATA.  
Chapter VI identifies all contributing and limiting factors relevant to the merger 
of FATA into KPK province and the extension of KPK’s governance jurisdiction into 
FATA. In addition, this chapter analyzes the FATA’s administration and economic 
shortfalls besides recommending an all-encompassing comprehensive reform package 







II. THE HISTORY OF FATA  
Historically, the tribal area of Pakistan has retained its independent status and 
functioned according to a nomadic tribal power structure, while resisting outside powers. 
A nomadic tribal society has inhabited FATA for centuries. Many invaders, including 
Alexander the Great, Changez Khan, Tamerlane, Mughals, and numerous others, crossed 
the mountain passes of FATA toward western India.37 Still, the tribal society has retained 
its nomadic culture and deflected the influence of outside invading powers passing 
through these tribal lands.  
Caroe highlights that, for the British, the mountain passes of FATA were the key 
attraction for a secure passage toward Afghanistan.38 Rugged mountainous terrain and 
tribal resistance forced the British to avoid direct control of FATA, contrary to the rest of 
India. Pakistan also continued the British policy to manage FATA without imposing its 
constitutional and legal framework. Due to the semi-independent status of FATA no 
administrative system could be installed, which led to the spread of lawlessness and 
militancy in FATA, Pakistan, and the region. 
Figure 1 depicts the geographical location of the Tribal Agencies of the FATA in 
relation to the rest of Pakistan: FATA of Pakistan is located between the Pakistan-
Afghanistan international border—the Durand Line—and the settled districts of the KPK 
province.  
                                                 
37 Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957, 3–17. 
38 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Tribal Agencies of the FATA—Pakistan.39 
 
                                                 
39 Source: Shuja Nawaz, The Most Dangerous Place (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies Press, 2009), 3, accessed June 14, 2016, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf. 
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A. PAKISTAN’S INDEPENDENCE AND AFGHANISTAN’S TROUBLES 
After 1947, the newly established Pakistan, confronted with multiple challenges 
to ensure its survival, did not find FATA worth the investment of its much-needed 
resources. The Pakistan’s ruling elite considered the consolidation of other areas 
politically more significant. In addition, Pakistan preferred to maintain the status quo in 
FATA to win the loyalty of tribes and to retain the relevance of the Durand Line.40 All 
three constitutions of Pakistan retained the semi-independent status of FATA in one form 
or the other. Chapter 2 of the 1956 constitution and article 223 of the 1962 constitution 
exempted FATA from the central and provincial jurisdiction. In accordance with article 
247, the 1973 constitution continued the semi-independent status of the tribal area, and 
FATA came under executive authority of the federation of Pakistan.  
In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, posing serious threats not only to the 
oil-rich Gulf, but to American interests in the Middle East. Coll explains that the CIA 
capitalized on the existing nomadic environment astride the Durand Line, both in FATA-
Pakistan and Eastern Afghanistan.41 Illiterate and unemployed youths—Afghan refugees, 
Pakistanis, Arabs, and young men from the rest of the Muslim world—were motivated by 
multiple-state sponsored mullahs, using American and Saudi money, to fight the so-
called holy war. These Islamic fundamentalists also gained significant control over the 
nomadic FATA due to state-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan.42 
The Pakistan-U.S.-Saudi Arabian effort combined political, diplomatic, military, 
propaganda, and intelligence means, and successfully forced the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan in 1988.43 After the Soviets’ withdrawal, the United States abandoned the 
fragmented mujahedeen groups without any rehabilitation or disarmament plan. After the 
disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the end of Cold War, the United States revisited its 
security interests in South Asia and shifted its focus to the Middle East and Iraq. The 
                                                 
40 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqood ul Hassan Nuri, eds., Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Challenges and 
Response (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 30–31. 
41 Coll, Ghost Wars, 125.  
42 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 184–186. 
43 Coll, Ghost Wars, 176–177. 
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United States not only stopped assistance to the mujahedeen, but also enforced military 
and economic sanctions against its Cold War ally Pakistan during the 1990s.44  
These religiously radicalized groups, now duly equipped with modern means of 
war, including American Stinger missiles, subsequently engaged in a fierce sectarian civil 
war to attain control over Kabul.45 Afghanistan fell into total chaos. Across the border, 
the dominant Islamic religious segment resisted any postwar efforts by Pakistan to 
integrate FATA into its central authority.  
After the Afghan-Soviet war, the continuity of Pakistan’s non-integration policy 
for FATA led an internal power struggle in the territory; the mujahedeen adopted ruthless 
practices against the local populace that marked the emergence of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda.46 At that time, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported the rise of the Taliban—
the former to promote Wahhabism,47 and the latter, out of national security interests. 
Ultimately in 1995–1996, Mullah Omar established himself as caliph in 
Afghanistan, forming a government with major areas of the territory under the Taliban’s 
control.48 The Taliban, despite coming to power in Afghanistan, continued using FATA’s 
strongholds and challenged Pakistan’s efforts to re-establish its control. This growing 
influence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in FATA, and the resultant rise of the militancy 
among their followers, deprived the state-nominated tribal chiefs, known as maliks, of 
their traditional influence and powers. Instead, they were replaced by fundamentalist 
religious clergy, who hijacked the tribes’ traditional social contract in the name of Islam.  
                                                 
44 Dianne E. Rennack, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions (CRS Report No. 
20995) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 2001). 
45 Coll, Ghost Wars, 204–224. 
46 Ibid, 295–300.  
47 Wahhabism is a dominant faith/sect of Islam followed in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism insists on literal 
interpretation of Quran.  
48 Coll, Ghost Wars, 328. 
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B. IMPACT OF GWOT AND PAKISTAN’S MILITARY CAMPAIGN ON 
FATA 
After 9/11, the GWOT forced the ruling Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives 
out of Afghanistan—only to see them re-establish their Soviet-Afghan War and Cold 
War-era strongholds in FATA. With the onset of GWOT, Pakistan changed its policy of 
patronization of the Taliban,49 and became the front line ally of the international coalition 
and started providing logistical support to and sharing intelligence pertaining to the 
Taliban with to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s alliance with the United States in GWOT resulted in the creation of the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), which dominated the population of FATA through terror, and 
spread the menace of terror to the settled areas and major cities of Pakistan.50 As a result, 
since 2006, the Taliban started indiscriminately attacking military and civilian targets in 
FATA and the rest of Pakistan.51  
Consequently, the Pakistan Army started military operations in 2004 to eradicate 
terrorist sanctuaries in FATA.52 During the initial stage of the military campaign, the 
Pakistan army undertook anti-terrorist operations in FATA with support from maliks, 
political agents, and Jirgas.53 In response, the terrorists killed hundreds of maliks, forcing 
the majority to either leave FATA or accept Taliban domination, thereby paralyzing the 
nomadic tribal liaison system with the central government.54  
Pakistan’s government is following a comprehensive plan for the return and 
rehabilitation of the IDPs.55 The United Nations October 2016 estimates highlight that, so 
                                                 
49 Hassan Askri, “Why Pakistan Joined War on Terror?,” Generation Next, November 24, 2010, 
accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.sagennext.com/2010/11/24/why-pakistan-joined-war-on-terror/.  
50 Khalid Homayun Nadiri, “Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan’s Posture toward Afghanistan 
since 2001,” International Security, no.2, 39 (2014): 149. 
51 “Body Count: Casuality Figures after 10 years,” 84–86. 
52 Shuja Nawaz, The Most Dangerous Place, 15.  
53 Ibid., 25–28.  
54 Ibid.  
55 “FATA Sustainable Return and Rehabilitation Strategy,” 7. 
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far, only 64 percent of the IDPs have returned.56 Figure 2 highlights the progress of the 
return of IDPs in each agency of FATA. 
Figure 2.  FATA—Return of IDPs—March 2015 to October 2016.57 
 
Note: On average, each family consists of six to seven persons. 
Pakistan has been engaged in active military operations in FATA since 2003–
2004. In 2005, Pakistan had more than 75,000 troops deployed in FATA areas, manning 
more than 600 border outposts along the Durand Line—as compared to 25,000 Afghan 
                                                 
56 “Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly Snapshot (from 7 to 13 October 2016),” United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, October 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, http://reliefweb.int/
report/pakistan/pakistan-fata-return-weekly-snapshot-7-13-october-2016. 
57 Source: “Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly Snapshot (from 7 to 13 October 2016),” 
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and ISAF troops on the other side.58 Unlike ISAF, the Pakistan Army, while operating in 
its own area, was compelled to exercise extreme restraint to avoid collateral damage. The 
use of excessive force, and resultant civilian causalities, could have deprived the Pakistan 
Army of popular public support vital for counter-insurgency operations.  
Amid fierce resistance in FATA and widespread violence across the country, 
Pakistan was forced to evolve a strategy in line with its national objectives and 
international and regional expectations of its allies. Pakistan insisted that the 
reconciliation efforts for peace in Afghanistan must involve every segment of society, 
especially the majority Pashtun. Pakistan’s military establishment considers that 
Afghanistan’s major ethnic group—the Pashtun—should have a significant role in 
shaping the future political outlook of the Afghanistan, apparently to guard Pakistan’s 
interests in Kabul.59 The selection of Pashto-speaking Ashraf Ghani as Afghan President 
has filled this void to an extent, and he is trying to engage the Pashtun Taliban in the 
political process.60 However, Pakistan considers that the alienation of Pashtuns from their 
political participation in Kabul may result in the rise of Pashtun nationalism, affecting 
Pakistan.  
Since the start of GWOT, FATA has allegedly hosted and protected the Afghan 
Taliban who have been instrumental in de-stabilizing Afghanistan. Criminals, drug 
traffickers, and weapons dealers have exploited the ungoverned porous areas astride the 
Durand Line. The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, as well as Al Qaeda operatives, have 
exploited the lack of governance and the absence of a border control mechanism in 
FATA and in adjacent Afghan areas to establish their strongholds. On numerous 
occasions, both the United States and Afghanistan have asked Pakistan to “do more” 
                                                 
58 The Hollings Centre, “The Durand Line: History, Consequences, and Future,” paper presented at 
The American Institute of Afghan Studies Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, October 2007, 11–12.  
59 Nadiri, “Old Habits, New Consequences,” 168.  
60 Aziz Amin Ahmadzai, “Hezb-e Islami’s Opening Is a Major Opportunity for Ashraf Ghani and 
Afghanistan,” Diplomat, May 11, 2016, accessed May 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/hezb-e-
islamis-opening-is-a-major-opportunity-for-ashraf-ghani-and-afghanistan/. 
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against the Taliban in FATA, and Pakistan has defended its limited capacity issues to 
monitor the Durand Line due to resource constraints.61  
Owing to limited resources and emerging Indian threats from the east,62 Pakistan 
chose a divide-and-conquer policy toward the Taliban by negotiating with a few, while 
fighting others. Since 2007, Pakistan conducted a systematically phased military 
campaign—code named Operation Al Miazan (OAM), from one agency of FATA to 
another)—and destroyed Taliban sanctuaries and strongholds throughout FATA. 
In 2014, the culminating military phase, commonly known as Zarb-e-Azb, was 
launched in North Waziristan Agency of FATA to flush out the Taliban, including the 
notorious Haqqani Network, and was fiercely contested by the Taliban. Amid this phase, 
Pakistan had more than 17,5000 soldiers engaged in counterinsurgency and stability 
operations in FATA.63 Operation Zarb-e-Azb effectively eliminated the Taliban’s 
strongholds from North Waziristan Agency, and at that time, U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry acknowledged that the notorious Haqqani Network was dismantled and its 
remnants fled to Afghanistan.64  
The Pakistan Army claims that after having flushed the Taliban out of FATA, it is 
now engaged in combing operations across the country against underground and sleeper 
cells of the Taliban.65 Owing to the destruction of the command and control structures of 
the Taliban, the security situation in Pakistan continues to improve significantly, and 
violence has been reduced significantly. In 2015, the number of the TTP’s attacks was the 
lowest since its formation in 2007.66 
                                                 
61 Shuja Nawaz, The Most Dangerous Place, 1. 
62 Here I am specifically referring to the 2002–2003 and 2008–2009 escalations when both Pakistan 
and India moved their forces to battle locations and were at the brink of war.  
63 Zulfiqar Ali, “Sleeper Cells Are Being Eliminated in KPK: Army,” Daily Dawn, May 31, 2016, 
accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1261720/sleeper-cells-being-eliminated-in-kp-army.  
64 Anwer Iqbal, “FATA Operations Forced Haqqanis to Flee: US,” Daily Dawn, February 25, 2016, 
accessed May 30, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1241796.  
65 Ayaz Ahmed, “FATA after Operation Zarb-e-Azb,” Defense Journal, (2016): 23. 
66 “Pakistan Maintains Defense Budget Increase as Security Improves,” Dunya News, June 4, 2016, 
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III. FATA’S ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL 
AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 
Contrary to the modern world and the rest of the Pakistan, since 1947, on the 
pretext of tribal identity, the tribal elite of FATA and the State of Pakistan have not 
introduced a workable governance system in FATA. In line with various articles of the 
1973 constitution, Pakistan still governs the FATA through the colonial FCR. The 
existing management mechanism limits the participation of FATA’s populace in 
governance, politics, and administrative decision making at all levels. In the absence of 
inclusive, participatory administrative, political, and judicial structures in FATA, 
tribesmen are deprived of the advantages and welfare acquired through modern 
democratic administrative, political, and judicial systems.  
This chapter examines the governance, political, and judicial systems that prevail 
in FATA, derived through the FCR. This chapter also analyzes how these systems 
deprive FATA’s tribesmen from a participatory role in their own government.  
A. FATA’S CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE  
Historically, FATA has been void of any administrative system, and today still 
functions through a segmented and nomadic tribal system in which power rests solely 
with the tribal leaders. Ancestral structures of the tribal societies promote inter-clan 
rivalry and disrupt central unity essential to political and administrative progress.67 The 
FCR-based administrative system, a vestige of 1901, grants enormous powers to the 
political agents, maliks. 
Since 1947, the Pakistani government’s federal Ministry of State and Frontier 
Regions (SAFRON) has supervised administrative and development issues of the FATA. 
Pakistan, as a democratic federation state, elects its federal and provincial governments 
through elections. Pakistan has numerous national and sub-national political parties. At 
                                                 
67 Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan: The Social Sciences’ Perspective (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 70.  
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times, different political parties have come into power at the federal and provincial levels. 
Irrespective of the elected provincial government, to safeguard federal interests in the 
province, the president appoints governors of all provinces who then act as 
representatives of the federation. Because FATA is not an independent province, FATA 
has neither a provincial constituent assembly nor representation in KPK’s provincial 
assembly. The governor of KPK administers FATA on the behalf of the president of 
Pakistan.68 
As head of the provincial bureaucracy—the chief secretary of KPK—and the 
tribal affairs secretary conduct liaison between the governor and chief minister of KPK to 
oversee the administrative and financial management and governance of FATA districts 
in consultation with the FATA Secretariat and Ministry of SAFRON.69 Figure 3 depicts 
the existing organization of the administrative system the FATA. 
                                                 
68 Cheema, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 49.  
69 “Misgovernance –Radicalization Nexus in Pakistan,” 94. 
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Figure 3.   FATA’s Administrative System.70 
 
Pakistan’s Constitution empowers the president to decree regulations for 
administration and governance of FATA.71 The governor of KPK, to administer the 
seven agencies of FATA, appoints a chief bureaucrat in each agency, who is called a 
political agent. The office of the political agent retains absolute executive, financial, and 
judicial powers.72 The political agent for each tribal agency or administrative district 
governs each respective tribal agency through various subordinate officials known as 
assistant political agents, sub-division officers (tehsildar), and lower sub-division officers 
(naib-tehsildars).73 Political agents, through their subordinate staff, regulate trade, inter-
tribe land ownership issues, and plan, approve, and supervise development projects. All 
                                                 
70 Adapted from Muhammad Tayyab Ghafoor, “Impediments Involved in the Integration of FATA in 
the National Mainstream of Pakistan” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009).  
71 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” 
72 “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Asia Report,” International Crisis Group, 2009, 2, 
accessed October 14, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-countering-
militancy-fata.  
73 Mohsin A. Malik, “Information Operations and FATA Integration into National Mainstream” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2012), 10. 
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political agents of FATA’s agencies coordinate financial and development issues with the 
governor of KPK through the FATA Secretariat, and the Ministry of SAFRON oversees 
FATA’s administration as a federal agency.74  
To enforce governmental interests and policies, FATA’s administration, headed 
by the political agent, is assisted by the local militia or police force known as Khasadars, 
and staffed by local tribesmen of each respective tribal district of FATA. In addition to 
the approximately 16,000-man Khasadar force,75 federal law enforcement agencies 
including a paramilitary force—Frontier Corps—and Pakistan Army also act when 
summoned as an aid to civil power. Figure 4 highlights the organization of the political 
agent’s office in each of the FATA’s agencies. 
Figure 4.   Office of the Political Agent.76 
 
                                                 
74 Raza Rahman Khan, “Local Government System in FATA,” FATA Research Journal, (2014): 133, 
accessed October 16, 2016, http://frc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Research-Paper-7.pdf .  
75 Moeed Yousaf, Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2014), 107.  
76 Adapted from “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Asia Report,” International Crisis Group, 
2009.  
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Beyond political agents, tribal elders—maliks—are another significant component 
of FATA’s existing administrative system. As part of colonial legacy, with the consent of 
the governor of KPK, the political agents in each tribal agency nominate tribal maliks. 
Representing their respective tribes, these maliks, act as the tribes’ spokespeople and 
provide liaison while interacting with office of the political agents in the tribal districts. 
In consultation with political agents, the co-opted tribal maliks provide passage security, 
suppress crimes, ensure border control, and assist government officials in implementation 
of state policies in their respective tribal area of influence.77 As a recognition of loyalty 
to the state, the state of Pakistan awards monthly allowances and provides subsidies to 
the approximately 3,600 maliks.78 The maliks use these resources to manage the tribal 
affairs and ensure their dominance over their clans.79 
The status of malik is passed on to the next generation through male inheritance; 
however, the office of the political agent can cancel or suspend the status due to a malik’s 
inability to uphold the state interests.80 To retain their influence over nomadic society, the 
maliks accumulate material resources and conduct lobbying with the state administration 
in FATA and governor of KPK province.  
B. FATA’S CURRENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE  
At the national level, FATA’s political representation is limited to the national 
parliament only. Twelve members represents FATA in the lower house of parliament—
the National Assembly. These members are selected through adult suffrage. In contrast, 
the eight members, representing FATA in the upper house—the Senate—are selected by 
the members of the National Assembly.81 This indirect selection for Senate has led to 
corruption and malpractice, thereby enabling the corrupt and rich elite to dominate the 
electoral process. Political parties can not openly campaign due to the influence of radical 
                                                 
77 Hugh Beattie, Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (New York: Routledge, 2013), 34. 
78 Malik, “Information Operations and FATA Integration into National Mainstream,” 11.  
79 Claude Rakisits, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: A Critical No-Man’s Land,” paper presented at the 
Webster University Forum, Geneva, April 25, 2008. 
80 “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Asia Report,” 3. 
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religious elements.82 Nomadic traditions limit women’s participation in politics. FATA 
does not have any internal system for legislation, because there is no local government 
system in FATA.83  
FATA is comprised of seven tribal agencies: Bajaur, Mohmmand, Khyber, 
Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. Table 1 depicts the area, 
population, and tribal profile of FATA’s agencies. 
Table 1.   FATA—Profile of Agencies.84 
Agency 
Area Population- 1998 Census Major Tribes 
Km % Million % 
Bajaur  12,90 4.74 0.595 18.7 Utmankhel and Tarkhani 
Mohmmand 2,296 8.43 0.334 10.5 Mohmmand, Safi, and Utmankhel 
Khyber 2,576 9.46 0.547 17.2 Afridi, Shelmani, and Shinwari  
Kurram 3,380 12.42 0.448 14.1 Maqbal, Mengal, and Banghash,  
Orakzai 1,538 5.64 0.225 7.1 Mishti, Ferozekhel, and Bizoti 
North Waziristan 4.707 17.29 0.361 11.4 Utmanzai, Wazir, and Dawar 
South Waziristan 6,620 24.32 0.430 13.6 Mahsood, Ahmadzai, and Wazir 
 
Despite FATA’s representation in both the lower and the upper houses of 
parliament—the National Assembly and the Senate—Pakistan’s existing political 
structure prohibits the parliament to formulate any FATA-related legislation. Thus, 
FATA’s representatives in parliament influence and contribute to the formulation of 
                                                 
82 Asmatullah Khan and Muhammad Zaheer Khan, “Mainstreaming FATA through Legal and 
Political Reforms,” Journal of peace and Development, IV (January 2014):30, accessed August 27, 2016, 
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83 Khan, “Local Government System in FATA,” 135.  
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federal government and legislation applicable to the entire country of Pakistan—except 
FATA.85  
Twelve members represent FATA in Pakistan’s National Assembly, which 
consists of 342 members from all provinces and federal territories.86 Prior to 1997, the 
electoral college, comprising 35,500 maliks from FATA, selected these members.87 
However, since 1996, and after promulgation of the Adult Franchise Act in FATA, these 
members have been selected through direct elections.88 The members of the National 
Assembly elect eight members to represent FATA in the Senate.89  
In the elections of 1997, 2002, and 2008, FATA’s representative for national 
assembly contested these elections as independent candidates without any political 
parties’ affiliation. After extension of the Pakistan Political Parties Act to FATA in 2011, 
the political parties of Pakistan actively participated in the national assembly general 
elections of 2013 for the selection of 12 representatives from FATA. Various religious 
and mainstream political parties held meetings to mobilize voters in various tribal 
agencies. According to the election commission of Pakistan, the voter turn-out in the 
elections in 2013 increased to 36 percent, as compared to 31 percent in the elections of 
2008.90 Figure 5 highlights the political structure of the FATA. 
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Figure 5.  FATA’s Political Structure.91 
 
C. FATA’S CURRENT JUDICIAL STRUCTURE  
According to the FATA-related constitutional provisions, all administrative and 
criminal regulations enforced in other provinces are not applicable to FATA. In contrast 
to the rest of Pakistan, the constitution of Pakistan deprives FATA’s tribesmen from a 
formal judicial system, and nomadic and FCR-centric judicial structure is imposed upon 
FATA. The current judicial system in FATA is a mix of the traditional tribal courts 
system, political agents’ office, and FCR.  
According to the constitution, FATA’s tribesmen are not entitled to approach 
Pakistan’s apex courts—both High Court and Supreme Court—and lower courts for 
administration of justice.92 The political agents in FATA act as judicial magistrates, and 
enforce FCR to administer justice on matters pertaining to both the interests of the state 
and FATA’s tribesmen to include trade, commerce, and taxation, etc.93 FCR entrusts 
enormous judicial powers to political agents’ offices that include: confiscation of 
property; and forced exile and collective tribal punishment.94 Political agents enforce 
their decisions through Khasadars and co-opted tribal maliks. 
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While administering justice, the current judicial structure in FATA follows tribal 
tradition and FCR instead of Pakistan Penal Code. The Jirga—the local court—is an 
assembly of tribal elders that administers justice in inter and intra tribal disputes. Jirga 
provides justice and resolves disputes in line with nomadic traditions known as Riwaj.95 
James W Spain explains: “A Jirga in its simplest form is merely an assembly. Practically 
all community business, both public and private, is subject to its jurisdiction. In its 
operation, it is probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy that has existed since 
the original. It exercises executive, judicial, and legislative functions, and yet as an 
instrument for arbitration and conciliation.”96 In these Jirgas, the Pashtunwali, the tribal 
code of conduct, takes preference over the laws of Shariah—Islamic laws—based on 
religious principles. Table 2 explains the various types of Jirgas and their jurisdiction. 
Table 2.   FATA—Types of Jirgas.97 
Type Composition Jurisdiction 
Olasi or Qaumi or 
Informal 
Representative’s Jirga. 
Elders of a certain tribe 
or community. 
Disputes involving property rights, 
business, agriculture, and tribe’s other 
internal issues.  
Loya or Grand Jirga 
 
Tribal leaders, political 
and religious leaders. 
Issues related to international policy to 
include selection of new leader, 
declaration of war, and peace treaties.  
Sarkari or Official 
FCR Jirga 
Political agents and 
state-nominated maliks  
Civil and criminal cases involving state 
and the tribesmen. 
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D. RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL, AND JUDICIAL REFORMS 
IN FATA  
During the last two decades, after Afghan-Soviet war, and due to international 
pressure in the aftermath of 9/11, the political and security establishment of Pakistan has 
focused on addressing the deteriorating security situation in FATA. After 2001, the 
Pakistan government, in consultation with tribal elders, retired government officials, and 
scholars, devised a FATA reform package to improve various administrative and 
governance aspects of FATA; however, FATA’s bureaucratic power structure based on 
FCR, the fragile security situation, and ongoing military operations have stalled the true 
letter and spirit in the implementation of these reforms. 
Pakistan’s federal administration promulgated the Adult Franchise Act of 1996 to 
grant voting rights to the people of FATA,98 and in 2002 established the FATA 
Secretariat to streamline various development projects. In 2011, through a presidential 
order, the Pakistan Peoples Party’s (PPP) federal government approved FCR amendments 
that modified legal protection, prison regulations, and the FATA tribunal and financial 
audit laws for FATA.99  
As a substitute for a high court in FATA, the government also constituted the 
FATA Tribunal, an appellate body to review decisions of political agents in the judicial 
domain. The governor of KPK appoints members of the FATA Tribunal for a duration of 
three years. The FATA Tribunal consists of a chairman—a senior federal bureaucrat—
and three other members with requisite legal expertise.100 The federal government 
introduced the Political Parties Act of 2011101 to enable Pakistani political parties to 
contest general elections and also extended the Federal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to 
FATA in 2013. Most of the announced reforms pertained to the FATA’s political, 
judicial, and development aspects; however, the government refrained from altering the 
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FCR-centric essential administrative structure of FATA.102 Moreover, growing terrorism 
and subsequent military operations prevented implementation of the proposed reform 
package.  
During President Pervez Musharraf’s military regime, the only significant 
endeavor to improve the local administrative management of FATA occurred in 2005, 
with the formation of the Agency Council comprising local tribal representatives in 2005. 
The elected Agency Council was intended to act as a local government to undertake 
development and socio-economic uplift of FATA. However, bypassing the electoral 
process, the governor of the KPK nominated handpicked maliks as members of the 
council, thus depriving the local tribesmen of their basic electoral rights. Moreover, the 
Agency Council was not given any administrative and financial powers, and its role was 
transformed into an advisory body; thus, the creation of Agency Council proved futile.103  
E. ANALYSIS OF FATA’S CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL, 
AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS  
Under the prevailing environment in FATA, the tribesmen are victims of the 
corruption of political administration and maliks. The nexus of the political 
administration and tribal elite abuses the unaccountable governance system that alienates 
the local population in the formulation and implementation of policies. Prior to the 
current military operations, FATA’s administration lost power to the Taliban and its area 
of influence was significantly curtailed. However, the political administration has 
continued to retain its control over development and administrative funds to continue 
manipulation of finances for their illegitimate personal gains.104  
The alienation of tribesmen from local management, limited capacity of law 
enforcement agencies, and corruption of political agents and maliks, led to environments 
conducive to the rise and strengthening of militancy throughout the FATA. Taliban 
militants targeted and killed hundreds of state-loyal maliks and co-opted other maliks to 
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establish their control in FATA.105 As a result, Taliban militants, through violence and 
carnage, hijacked the tribal power structure, and maliks were replaced by the Taliban to 
become power brokers in FATA. Amid state-sponsored jihad, Taliban leaders 
accumulated power and authority through exploitation of the economic, tribal, and 
sectarian divide of FATA’s tribesmen. The administrative elite of FATA districts, due to 
inherent structural limitations and interference from the security establishment, not only 
failed to provide protection to local tribesmen, but at times were forced to negotiate peace 
deals with the Taliban for their own survival.106  
The FCR-based governance system in FATA has promoted the central authority 
of and provided absolute powers to the bureaucratic cadre led by political agents. The 
existing system grants enormous authority to these political agents that include the 
executive, judicial, and revenue powers. The decentralization of power at the grassroots 
level is essential to empower the local population to shape a deliberate and effective 
system.  
As a direct obstacle to implement reforms, the administrative bureaucracy 
forestalls any effort of the state to affect change, and lobbies to maintain the status quo to 
preserve its imperial authority. Despite the creation of the Agency Council in FATA, the 
political administration contested the grant of planning and financial authority to the 
FATA Council.107 The administration of FATA also resisted the creation of the local 
government system to retain its administrative monopoly over FATA.108 The creation of 
local counsels at various tiers would affect transfer of powers from the political agent’s 
office to elected bodies and undermine the bureaucratic authority. The persistence of the 
status quo enables the administration to continue its misappropriation and exploitation of 
resources for personal enrichment. 
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Amid asymmetric warfare, the Pakistan military’s inability to differentiate 
between friends and foe has led to serious human rights violations in FATA, contrary to 
UN declarations.109 From 2008 to 2015, excessive use of force by the military violated 
basic human rights, which created resentment amongst the tribesmen against the military. 
In June 2011, the federal government of Pakistan authorized its military to conduct 
operations as Action in Aid to the Civil Power.110 Action in Aid to the Civil Power 
authorized the military to arrest and detain any individual on suspicion of terrorism links 
and confiscate land and other material resources without any legal proceedings. The 
Action in Aid to the Civil Power deprived the FATA tribesmen of their fundamental 
human rights contrary to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.111 
These frequent violations of human rights by security agencies damaged the tribesmen’s 
trust in the state. 
In addition to the lack of education and infrastructure, no print or electronic media 
exists in FATA to counter the militants’ propaganda, which is mostly on the radio. The 
majority of the population relies on radio; only a few influential elites have access to 
satellite television. In developed and developing societies, media plays a significant role 
in providing information and creating awareness among the general public. The 
constitution of Pakistan accords rights to its citizens for access to information; but as the 
constitution of Pakistan does not apply to FATA, FATA’s population is deprived of any 
such rights—and of access.  
Because FATA does not possess its own public service mechanism, the policies 
of extra-territorial administration do not correspond to the requirements of FATA. The 
officers’ cadre of the political administration and FATA Secretariat is selected from the 
federal and provincial bureaucracy. Government bureaucrats are selected through federal 
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and provincial competitive academic examination from all over Pakistan. Due to better 
academic background, a majority of selected government officials hail from settled 
districts of Pakistan and representation of FATA’s population is negligible.112 The 
influential families of FATA have moved to major cities for higher education and do not 
return to FATA due to deteriorating law and order conditions. Therefore, educated and 
skilled indigenous manpower in FATA is not available to replace the existing political 
administration hailing from other parts of Pakistan. Thus, the government officials, 
responsible for formulating governance strategies lack understanding of FATA’s 
complicated structural shortfalls.  
In addition, the FATA Secretariat is located at Peshawar, away from FATA, and 
the majority of officials are unaware of FATA’s problems, priorities, and requirements. 
Owing to inherent ignorance of administrative officials, government policies are aimed to 
establish territorial control, instead of winning hearts and minds of tribesmen and 
absorbing FATA into Pakistan’s state system.  
The federal and FATA establishments fear erosion in its imperialistic authority if 
elected representatives in FATA are empowered.113 The indigenous representatives may 
reduce the state’s co-opting capability to implement its policies in FATA. FATA’s 
administration failed to adopt policy measures to improve socio-economic conditions. 
Unlike the rest of Pakistan, under the FCR and constitutional arrangements, seven 
agencies of FATA remained deprived of elected government institutions at all tiers 
including agency, divisional, and sub-divisional levels. In FATA, no indigenous 
mechanism exists to formulate laws for its administration, creating a political, 
governance and legal vacuum. The nonexistent local government system has affected the 
enforcement of law and order that has helped the Taliban to thrive while exploiting the 
poverty-ridden, unemployed tribesmen.114 
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Although the political reforms of the last two decades were aimed at generating 
an inclusive political process in FATA, these reforms have proved futile; the FCR-centric 
imperialistic structure continues to dominate the socio-political management of FATA. 
Pakistan’s current constitutional framework restricts parliament from any legislation 
concerning FATA.  
Moreover, the absence of FATA’s integral provincial assembly or representation 
in KPK also denies tribesmen the right to formulate polices relating to local government. 
In addition, the absence of an election regulation mechanism in FATA has led to 
corruption and malpractice, thereby enabling the corrupt and rich elite to dominate its 
politics. Moreover, under the current security situation, the political parties can not 
openly campaign due to the influence of radical religious elements. The nomadic 
traditions of FATA also limit women’s participation in politics and elections. The tribal 
norms and religious ideology promote male dominance and curtail women’s participation 
in politics.  
The constitution of Pakistan separates the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the government, whereas, FCR vests all governmental powers in the political 
agent’s office. The current judicial system comprising nomadic tribal Jirgas and political 
agents administers justice with traditional and executive authority. The relevant clauses 
of the Pakistan Criminal Act are not applicable to FATA. The people of FATA do not 
have access to any state institution to challenge the Jirga’s verdicts.115 The FATA’s 
Tribunal, led by the bureaucrats, has not been able to safeguard basic human rights under 
the FCR-centric FATA. The Supreme Court’s 1993 FCR-related decision observes that 
the “mere existence of a tribal society or a tribal culture does not by itself create a 
stumbling block in the way of enforcing ordinary procedures of criminal law, trial and 
detention which is enforceable in the entire country.”116  
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IV. FATA’S EXISTING ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
Poverty and deprivation help spread terrorism, and similarly terrorism affects the 
socio-economic development of a society. The economic plight of FATA is both 
symptom and cause of its marginality. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have exploited the 
existing economic deprivation of FATA’s tribesmen through economic incentives.117 In 
the last seven decades since Pakistan’s independence, the settled areas of Pakistan—
governed in accordance with the constitution of Pakistan—have achieved significant 
socio-economic progress, while FATA remained deprived of any socio-economic uplift. 
FATA’s marginality from mainstream Pakistan promoted and bred terrorism that further 
worsened the economic situation. After 9/11, the ongoing GWOT in Pakistan’s FATA 
and Afghanistan has further deteriorated the socio-economic conditions of the residents 
of FATA. Despite ousting the Taliban from FATA, Pakistan has not been able to revive 
the economy of FATA because of the lack of formal institutions.  
Contrary to internationally recognized economic principles,118 the government of 
Pakistan, for more than half a century, has neglected the socio-economic development of 
the FATA due to its own economic constraints, lack of political will, and security 
concerns. The economic uplift, independence, and prosperity of FATA’s populace would 
significantly help in the attainment of peace and stability in FATA, Pakistan, and the 
region. This chapter examines the current economic status of FATA, and evaluates 
factors contributing to its deteriorating socio-economic conditions. This chapter also 
analyzes the economic potential and prospects of FATA. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF FATA’S EXISTING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
FATA’s economy is agrarian, and agriculture is limited to valleys where 
irrigational water, from local streams and rivers, is easily available. According to 2004 
estimates, only 7 percent of FATA was under cultivation, with 44 percent under an 
irrigation network; the rest of the arid areas are dependent of rainfall.119 Table 3 indicates 
land use in FATA. 
Table 3.   Agriculture Land Use in FATA.120 
Land Use Area (Hectors) 
Total Reported Area 2,722,042 
Cultivated Area 199,530 
Irrigated Area 87,101 
Forests 46,202 
Uncultivated Area 2,468,512 
 
The political agents of the seven tribal agencies still manage socio-economic 
issues in consultation with maliks. The political agents’ economic functions include 
regulation of trade, natural resources, and approval, supervision, and management of 
development projects.121 Under the existing system, the political agents enjoy extreme 
financial autonomy with no auditing body in FATA to supervise the policy-making 
process and utilization of finances.  
In the last two decades, in a bid to eradicate poverty, the federal government of 
Pakistan has also enhanced the resource allocation for the socio-economic development 
of FATA. The federal budget of 2003–2004 allocated US$30 million for FATA, whereas, 
during financial year 2008–2009 US$80 million,122 and in the year 2016–2017, US$180 
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million were allocated for the development of FATA.123 The FATA Secretariat and 
FATA Development Authority work with various international donor agencies like 
USAID124 and the Multi Donor Trust Fund125 in socio-economic projects of mutual 
interest in FATA.  
FATA does not have any mechanism to generate revenue or levy taxes to meet 
administrative expenses and execute development projects. FATA Secretariat depends on 
Pakistan’s federal government for allocation of resources to meet the aforementioned 
expenses.126 Therefore, amid the other demands of GWOT on Pakistan’s fragile 
economy, Pakistan has to bear the cost of a decade-long war in FATA.  
After 9/11, Pakistan government undertook certain measures for socio-economic 
development of FATA. The governor of KPK, as representative of the federal 
government, coordinates the economic and other functions of FATA Secretariat. The 
FATA Secretariat, comprising various departments and directorates, was established in 
2002.127 The FATA Development Authority was created in 2006 to overcome financial 
and management deficiencies in the governance of FATA.128  
These departments were created to identify, evaluate, plan, and implement the 
immediate, medium-term, and long-term projects.129 The FATA Secretariat includes, 
“health, education, forestry, fisheries, irrigation, livestock, minerals and technical 
education, agriculture, sports, social welfare, and roads and other infrastructure 
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development directorates.”130 Figure 6 explains the organization of departments within 
the FATA Secretariat.  
Figure 6.  The Organization of FATA Secretariat.131 
 
B. FATA’S PREVAILING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The divergence in socio-economic indicators between FATA and the rest of 
Pakistan suggests that the FATA is the most underdeveloped, poorest area in Pakistan. 
The population of FATA lacks education, healthcare, infrastructure, and technical and 
industrial skills; therefore, trade, commercial, and industrial activities are very limited.132 
Amid the lack of administrative infrastructure and limited access—due to security 
concerns—of non-government organizations and independent institutions to FATA, 
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government departments, with limited reliability, are the only source of data about 
FATA. The Multidimensional Poverty Index of Pakistan indicates uneven progress in 
different parts of Pakistan. Some 73 percent of the population of FATA lives below the 
poverty line compared with a national average of 39 percent in Pakistan.133 Table 4 
highlights the socio-economic indicators of FATA.  
Table 4.   Socio-economic Indicators of FATA and Pakistan.134 
 
 
Since 2006, the intense military operations in FATA and displacement of FATA’s 
population have severely affected the already declining agriculture. In most of FATA, 
farmers follow old agriculture techniques and yield only one crop from cultivated units: 
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per-hector production in FATA is 38 percent less than in the rest of Pakistan.135 
Livestock rearing and poultry are essential elements of FATA’s agricultural economy; 
however, shortage of green pastures and fodder, and the absence of veterinary services 
have had adverse effects.  
All seven agencies of FATA lack industrial infrastructure to provide indigenous 
industrial goods and employment opportunities to the population. Only a few privately 
owned firms, encompassing approximately 10,000 industrial workers, exist that deal in 
stone processing, furniture manufacturing, mineral extraction, textile weaving, and 
weapons production.136 Due to the absence of any economic management institutions, the 
FATA’s economy is widely undocumented. The State Bank of Pakistan and other 
financial institutions do not extend loans to FATA’s people to establish businesses and 
industry.137 Amid the lack of an industrial base, the majority of the skilled workforce has 
migrated to the Middle East and other countries. Pakistan’s Labor Migration Status 
Report for 2015 indicates that 5.1 percent of its overseas immigrants belonged to FATA 
as compared to FATA’s 2.3 percent share of Pakistan’s population.138 After agriculture, 
the other major source of income for the population of FATA is trade and commerce. 
FATA’s people mostly have retail and wholesale trade, services, transport, and 
businesses related with Afghanistan Transit-Trade.139 Opium cultivation, processing, and 
trafficking, although recently curtailed, has been a traditional part of FATA’s economy.  
Like other socio-economic amenities, FATA also lacks power and communication 
infrastructure as compared to the rest of the country. Only 6 percent of households have 
access to the power supply; extended power interruptions and low voltage are a common 
phenomenon that affects industrial growth and production.140 In the mountainous terrain 
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of FATA, there is an acute shortage of high quality roads to connect remote areas with 
towns and cities. FATA’s road density is 0.17 per kilometer, whereas, Pakistan’s average 
is 0.26 per kilometer.  
C. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FATA’S ECONOMIC 
DETERIORATION 
Citizens’ trust and loyalty to their respective states have linkages to the socio-
economic amenities they derive from the state; anti-state actors—the Taliban—have 
exploited the diminishing economic rights of the people in FATA. The population’s 
economic independence and access to social amenities significantly affect the people’s 
loyalty toward the concurrent modern state system. The prevailing socio-economic 
indicators, despite the organizational and financial endeavors of Pakistan’s government, 
depict deteriorating conditions. Recent institutional capacity building and enhanced 
financial allocation by the federal government have not been able to bridge the decades-
old development gap in FATA.  
Multiple factors contribute to the deteriorating economic situation in FATA, and 
these include the absence of administrative structure; corruption of political agents and 
FATA’s political and social elite; impact of ongoing military operations and resultant 
IDPs; paucity of industries, communication, and power infrastructure; lack of formal and 
technical education; and unemployment and brain drain. In the absence of an effective 
audit mechanism, political agents and maliks have engaged in corruption and 
misappropriation of already meager funds. These maliks identify the type and site for 
development projects, nominate contractors, and gain huge economic benefits at the cost 
of quality, utility, and development of the local population.141 This financial malpractice 
enables the tribal elite to accumulate money and subsequently dominate politics, leaving 
the population subject to poverty, unemployment, and economic dependency. A report of 
the FATA Civil Secretariat highlights that, “With development activity geared towards 
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the interests of elite, it is no surprise that FATA remains one of the most poorly 
developed areas in the country.”142  
Development grants for FATA have been worth far less than for other areas of 
Pakistan. According to the National Finance Commission’s (NFC) financial distribution 
mechanism, FATA has not been given its due per capita share. From 2010 to 2015, on 
average FATA received less than half of the per capita development share in comparison 
to other provinces of Pakistan.143 The NFC award is not applicable to FATA; Pakistan’s 
federal government allocates a fixed financial amount for FATA, which is always a lower 
per capita share compared to KPK and other provinces. In each fiscal year, the federal 
government allocates funds for FATA as a top-down policy that promotes the 
establishment’s patronage and alienates local stakeholders—especially the local 
populace—to identify, plan, and execute projects to address their socio-economic plight.  
Amid the lack of employment opportunities and growth of security concerns in 
FATA, the educated and skilled youth endeavors to find jobs abroad or in other cities of 
Pakistan and prefer to live with better social services. These phenomena result in brain 
drain, and FATA’s population is deprived of the services of doctors, engineers, teachers, 
and other professional experts.  
In the past decade, ongoing military operations, besides negatively affecting 
agriculture and economy, have resulted in destruction of education and health 
infrastructure in FATA regions. A large number of schools have been destroyed, and the 
education process for local tribal youth has almost ceased, further hampered socio-
economic progress in FATA.  
Amid lack of employment opportunities, a significant number of FATA’s 
population is involved in illicit trade to earn their livelihoods. These activities include 
cross-border smuggling of contraband, such as firearms, electronics, and drugs from 
Afghanistan, and kidnapping for ransom. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade 
Agreement, Talibanization on both sides of Durand Line, corrupt administration, and the 
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absence of an effective border control mechanism facilitate these illegal businesses. 
According to Pakistan’s official estimates, through illegal business from unfrequented 
border routes, such businesses evade taxes worth US$50–60 million each month.144 The 
United Nations estimates of 2009 indicate that the illicit drug trade business was worth 
US$68 billion, with more than a 95 percent share belonging to Afghanistan.145 The huge 
trade and illegal money create a security dilemma for Afghanistan, but the secure 
smuggling route also adversely affects security and socio-economic conditions in FATA 
and the rest of Pakistan.  
Since 2014, more than 341,916 families (more than 3.7 million people) from 
various agencies of FATA have become IDPs because of the military operations.146 These 
IDPs lost their crops, businesses, and homes to the combat. The rehabilitation of IDPs 
requires significant finances and is a major constraint on other development projects. The 
government of Pakistan, according to the progress of military operations, has planned the 
return and rehabilitation of these IDPs to their native areas in five phases, spread over two 
years. For their return, each IDP family is entitled to around US$350.147 Table 5 reflects 
the detailed timeline and expenditures for return and rehabilitation of IDPs. 
Table 5.   Return and Rehabilitation Plan—FATA IDPs.148 






March–August 2015 Phase 1 12.93 35.28 48.2 
August–December 2015 Phase 2 4.71 11.17 16.5 
January–June 2016 Phase 3 2.49 6.23 8,72 
August–December 2016 Phase 4 and 5 12.86 32.17 45.03 
Total 33.01 85.48 118.49 
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D. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS OF FATA 
FATA’s mineral deposits, fertile lands, human resources, and geographical 
location—gateway to Afghanistan and the Central Asian States—provide significant 
economic potential for FATA. However, each agency of FATA has a particular economic 
potential due to the differences in respective resources.  
Extraction of mineral resources in FATA is likely to generate significant revenue 
vital to FATA’s economic development. Moreover, the mining will engage FATA’s 
population in economic activity, thereby leading to prosperity and socio-economic uplift. 
The Department of Geological Survey of Pakistan has identified 19 types of various 
mineral deposits in FATA. North Waziristan and Mohmmand agencies possess copper 
and gold deposits of more than 50 million tons of copper.149 It is estimated that Khyber 
and Mohmmand agencies also house marble and lime deposits.150 Superior quality coal, 
chromite, and soap stones have been identified in Bajhur, Orakzai, and Kurram 
agencies.151 Due to the volatile security situation in the recent past, despite contracts and 
agreements with foreign extraction companies, these identified mineral deposits have not 
been extracted. Moreover, the remaining areas await survey to identify potential deposits.  
FATA possesses the potential to expand its agriculture and agro-based industries 
through exploring its untapped land resource. Only 44 percent of FATA’s cultivable land 
is under cultivation, and amid lack of scientific practices, these traditional agro-farms 
only produce one crop per year.152 By expansion of the irrigation network, the remaining 
56 percent of the land can be brought under agricultural use. Using agricultural science 
and modern means of agro-production, farmers can yield 3–4 crops during a year.  
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According to the 1998 Census of Pakistan and current estimates, 40–45 percent of 
FATA’s population is below the age of 25.153 This young segment of the population 
provides a vital workforce; FATA’s youth—with provision of education and technical 
skills—can be integrated into various economic activities to enhance the productivity of 
FATA. 
FATA’s geographical location—on the crossroads linking landlocked 
Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) with the Indian Ocean, Middle East, 
and Far East Asia—provides FATA a potential to emerge as a transit-trade hub. In 2014, 
Pakistan and China concluded an important economic project called the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC has been planned to pass through the entire 
north-south length of Pakistan, as a part of the “One Belt One Road” initiative of China. 
The CPEC includes 51 projects related to railroad infrastructure, power generation, 
industrial zones, and port construction at Gwadar.154 Worth US$46 billion, the CPEC 
project is comprised of three routes: eastern, central, and western routes, which lie in 
areas adjacent to FATA.155 Through this under-construction railroad network, passing 
through the entire north-south length of Pakistan, China will be connected with the Indian 
Ocean at Gwadar port, and many road projects are nearing completion.156 The project is 
not only significant for Pakistan but also vital for FATA as its western route passes 
through KPK’s areas adjacent to FATA; and subsequently, CPEC will extended toward 
Afghanistan and the CARs through FATA. China has already intensified its efforts to 
engage Afghanistan and the CARs in CPEC. The westward extension of CPEC and its 
related projects will carry with it huge development prospects and opportunities for 
FATA.  
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V. EXISTING POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC, 
AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF KPK PROVINCE 
KPK province, neighboring FATA, is also inhabited by Pashtuns, who speak a 
similar language and practice similar social, culture, and religious beliefs as those of 
FATA tribes. During the British colonial era, certain districts of North Western Frontier 
Province—renamed KPK in 2009—and agencies of FATA remained under the 
jurisdiction of FCR. However, under the 1956 constitution the KPK districts were 
absorbed into the federal mainstream—exactly what did not happen with FATA then or 
with the 1973 constitution.157 Figure 7 depicts the districts of the KPK and adjacent 
agencies of the FATA. 
                                                 
157 Ullah, “Governance Reforms in FATA of Pakistan,” 217.  
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Figure 7.  Districts of KPK and Adjacent Agencies of the FATA.158 
 
                                                 
158Source: “Base Map of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA,” Information Management Unit, 2011,  
accessed November 8, 2016, http://complex.pakresponse.info/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6BFvwGo34ZI%3D&tabid=71&mid=465.  
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In contrast to FATA, the KPK province today functions through a modern 
governance system that incorporates political, administrative, economic, and judicial 
aspects. As compared to the tribesmen of FATA, the residents of KPK live under better 
living conditions.159 Unlike FATA, KPK’s constitutional institutions exercise their legal 
and executive authority through an inclusive and participatory democratic process. The 
presence of better governing institutions, law enforcement, and socio-economic 
infrastructure have been vital to the development process in KPK, even as the prevailing 
instability and lawlessness in FATA has had spillover effects in the adjacent KPK areas. 
In the light of the significant cultural and social similarities between FATA and 
KPK—and the very different situation prevailing in each—this chapter examines the 
present administrative, political, economic, and judicial systems enforced in KPK 
province. KPK’s governmental structures are identical to the other provinces of Pakistan, 
all of which are derived from Pakistan’s constitutional framework. This chapter also 
identifies and analyzes the main contributing and limiting factors relevant in adaptation 
and application of a governance system in FATA identical to KPK’s governance system.  
A. KPK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Similar to other provinces of Pakistan, the KPK province also possesses a 
provincial lawmaking assembly, law enforcement institutions, law enforcement 
mechanism, and local government system. KPK’s political institutions comprise the 
provincial assembly, local government bodies, and representation at both houses of the 
national parliament. The KPK’s provincial assembly consists of 124 members, including 
the directly elected members, reserved seats for women, and seats reserved for non-
Muslim minorities directly elected by the minority population of the province. The 
Speaker of the provincial assembly runs the business of the house through 37 standing 
committees. The members of the provincial assembly elect the chief minister, who is 
head of the provincial government and executes his functions through his cabinet formed 
by various ministers and advisers on different functions such as home, finance, trade 
                                                 
159 “Poverty Profile of Pakistan,” Benazir Income Support Program, 2013, 5, accessed November 7, 
2016, http://www.bisp.gov.pk/PIDEReports/poverty.pdf.  
 50
health, education, law, etc. The federal and provincial ministers are assisted by 
bureaucrats along with their staff, in formulation and execution of administrative policies 
of the government. Besides the ministries and appointed advisors, specific public sector 
development programs and foreign-funded programs, and other bilateral and multilateral 
organizations also assist the government in the development and governance domain.  
The budget for governance, development, and other state affairs is generated 
through direct and indirect tax collection. Financial deficits are met through grants and 
internal and international loans from international monetary institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. The collected revenue and 
loans are distributed by the federal government among the federation and provinces in 
accordance with a mutually agreed upon mechanism called the National Finance 
Commission.160  
B. KPK’S ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
Identical to the other provinces of Pakistan, the chief minister of KPK acts as 
chief executive of the KPK’s province and is elected by the members of the provincial 
assembly; whereas, the governor is appointed by the federal government and acts on 
advice from the chief minister. For the ease of administrative function, the KPK province 
has been divided into various administrative divisions. Each division consists of multiple 
districts; in total, there are 7 divisions and 25 districts in KPK. 
The districts are governed by district coordination officers with the assistance of the 
heads of various departments. The officers of these departments are recruited through 
Central Superior Services, Provincial Civil Service, and at times consultants and project 
managers, and staff is recruited directly by the province. The KPK’s administration 
consists of 31 departments besides the Local Government Elections and Rural 
Development Department.161  
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The chief secretary of the KPK province regulates and supervises the divisional 
commissioners in implementation and execution of governance policies of the provincial 
government within the legal framework. The divisional commissioners perform 
supervisory and coordinating functions for various departments at the divisional level 
besides administering district management of all aspects including law and order, 
revenue, and monitoring and evaluation of provincial development plans through the 
district coordination officers of their respective districts.162 The commissioners can 
approve development projects up to US$400,000 in their respective divisions.  
At the district level, the district coordination officers act as head of district 
administration and supervise the functions of all management and development 
departments within the districts in consultation with district heads of their respective 
departments. These departments normally include Law, Local Government, Planning and 
Development, Health, Education, Food, Forest, Technical Education, Finance, Social 
Welfare, Tourism, Agriculture, Information, Transport, Excise and Taxation, Industry, 
Labor, Irrigation, Livestock, Housing, and Population Welfare.163 However, the police 
department is controlled directly by the provincial inspector general of police through the 
regional police officer at the divisional level and district police officers.  
The local governance system is of paramount importance for the provision of 
health, education, and other basic amenities to the populace.164 The 1973 constitution of 
Pakistan requires provincial governments to establish local governing bodies through 
direct elections.165  
In 2013, the present government of Pakistan, Tahreek-e-Insaf (PTI), passed the 
Local Government Act of 2013.166 Under this act, elections of government bodies were 
held in 2014, and more than 45,000 members at the district, sub-division, and town levels 
were elected to undertake local governance throughout the province of KPK. The Local 
                                                 
162 Barth, The Governance Landscape of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 7.  
163 Ibid., 3–5.  
164 Aziz Khalid, “Appraisal of Local Governance in KPK,” Criterion Quarterly, 11 (2016): 171. 
165 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” 
166 Khalid, “Appraisal of Local Governance in KPK,” 165.  
 52
Bodies Act of 2013 empowers the local representatives to plan and execute projects, 
thereby transforming powers to the grassroots level in line with the constitution.  
KPK’s Local Government Act of 2013 outlines the formulation of its local 
government at various tiers: District Councils, City Municipal Administration, Tehsil 
Municipal Administration, Neighborhood Councils, and Village Councils. The Act also 
lays down the powers and jurisdiction of various entities of the local governance system 
that accords efficiency and prevents ambiguity in discharging of their respective 
functions. The Local Government Act of 2013 highlights the role of governance bodies, 
which mainly include the policy of formulation and provision of services, formulation of 
budget and imposition of taxes, development plans and related regulations, and hiring, 
evaluation, and firing of local governance staff.167  
C. KPK’S ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
The economic management system of KPK, like all other provinces within 
Pakistan, manages the socio-economic progress of the province along modern lines. 
However, due to its geographical proximity to war-torn FATA and Afghanistan, KPK 
province has faced significant economic and social effects from the war as compared to 
the rest of Pakistan. The KPK’s residents plan and execute these policies through their 
own local government. Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf’s present government of KPK has 
implemented all-encompassing strategies to counter militancy in KPK’s adjacent areas of 
FATA. In addition to other indigenous initiatives, the government of KPK, in 
consultation with the World Bank, has evolved a strategy to enhance economic, 
employment, health, education, governance, and other socio-economic aspects of the 
province.168 The major departments of KPK’s government dealing with economic 
developments include finance, revenue, excise and taxation, industries, labor, agriculture, 
irrigation, mines and minerals, energy and power, planning and development, science and 
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technology, information technology, education, health, housing, and food. These 
departments are headed by provincial ministers who are assisted by their respective 
secretaries and secretariat staff along with sub-offices at the divisional and districts level.  
Pakistan’s central government accumulates finances in the Federal Divisible Pool 
and subsequently divides these among the federation and provinces through a distribution 
mechanism called The National Finance Commission Award (NFC Award). The NFC 
Award allocates funds among the province based on a per capita share corresponding to 
the provincial population. Based on the NFC Award, KPK’s government received U.S. 
$2.7 billion as share for year 2015–2016.169 Table 6 indicates the share of each province 
for financial year 2014–2015.  
Table 6.   NFC Award—Provincial Share for Financial Year 2014–2015.170 
Distribution of Pakistan’s 
Divisible Pool Tax 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
51.74 % 24.55 % 14.62% 9.09 % 100 %
 
The succeeding governments of KPK have introduced policies to improve the 
socio-economic status in the province. The incumbent PTI government in KPK has 
introduced an Integrated Development Strategy 2014–2018, and Pervaiz Khattak, the 
Chief Minister of KPK, states that, “Despite the increasingly uneven development that 
characterizes KPK, we dream of a province where all people enjoy equal opportunities, 
wealth and rights. And we are working together to transform that dream into reality.”171  
The main pillars of the Integrated Development Strategy 2014–2018 include 
improving productivity and value addition, provision of services to citizens, governance 
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transparency and accountability, expanding tax collection and raising overseas 
remittances, and promotion of regional trade and structural connectivity.172 The major 
areas of socio-economic reforms include poverty reduction, energy production including 
alternative energy resources, agriculture sector, mining and minerals, human resources 
development, industrial management, improvement of infrastructure and transport, and 
education and health service delivery.173 If these policies are implemented and pursued in 
the true letter and spirit, they are likely to contribute significantly to improving economic 
conditions in KPK.  
D. KPK’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM  
KPK’s judicial structure reflects all provincial judicial systems in Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s current judicial system evolved, amid intermittent changes, according to the 
constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973. Pakistan inherited its judicial system from the 
British Colonial Administration that is still enforced in all four provinces, including KPK, 
although with intermittent amendments from federal and provincial governments.  
Similar to other provinces in Pakistan, KPK’s current judicial system has 
primarily two tiers: superior judiciary and subordinate courts. The superior judiciary is 
composed of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court–provincial 
court. The subordinate courts include civil courts and criminal courts.174 The Supreme 
Court is the apex of Pakistan’s judicial system and besides functioning as the original 
court, also acts as the appellate and advisory bodies and highest appellate court. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction throughout the country, excluding FATA. Peshawar High 
Court is the supreme judicial body of KPK’s province. All 25 administrative districts of 
the KPK province have their own civil and criminal courts. Figure 8 depicts the judicial 
system of KPK. 
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Figure 8.  Judicial System of KPK.175 
 
Table 7 depicts a number of various courts and the strength of law officers and 
lawyers in KPK. 
Table 7.   Judicial Statistics—KPK.176 
Category Number Remarks 
Judges of Peshawar High Court *20 * Including Chief Justice 
District and Session Judges 25  
Additional District and Session Judges 103  
Senior Civil Judges and Civil Judges/ Magistrates 322  
Advocate General / Additional Advocate General *13 *Including Advocate General 
Deputy / Assistant Advocate General 17  
Prosecutor General 1  
Additional/Deputy /Assistant Prosecutor General 207  
Law officers and District Attorney 67  
Deputy / Assistant Public Prosecutor 180  
Advocate High Peshawar Court 6498  
Advocate Subordinate Courts 8692  
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E. KPK AND FATA IN COMPARISON 
The extension of the constitutional framework to KPK in 1956 has resulted in the 
creation of modern democratic political, governing, judicial, and economic institutions in 
KPK, whereas, FATA is deprived of any such institutions. Despite structural and 
management limitations, KPK has detailed working governance mechanisms to supervise 
and regulate administrative functions essential for any evolving society. By contrast, the 
FATA does not have any working governance mechanism.  
The constitution of Pakistan has enabled the residents of KPK to contribute in 
formulation of governance and economic policies according to their own requirements and 
priorities. Similarly, for stability and development in FATA, the establishment of a 
comprehensive administrative mechanism, through constitutional and legal amendments, is 
essential for any meaningful endeavor to integrate FATA into the Pakistani national system.  
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VI. WAY FORWARD FOR FATA’S INTEGRATION INTO 
PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL SYSTEM 
The state of Pakistan has sustained significant human and financial losses to evict 
Taliban from FATA. However, the persistent lawlessness and absence of a functional 
governance system in FATA may result in the re-emergence of Taliban. As a result of 
such apprehensions, Pakistan’s administration is in the process of evaluating various 
models of administrative, political, economic, and judicial reforms to integrate FATA 
under its central control. However, as a prelude to a governance reform package, the 
administrative and political status of FATA needs to be ascertained under a legal 
framework with due approval of FATA’s populace.  
This final chapter evaluates available options for FATA’s integration into 
Pakistan’s mainstream. This chapter also suggests multidimensional reforms for political, 
administrative, judicial, and economic mechanisms for the empowerment of FATA’s 
tribesmen.  
A. OPTIONS FOR FATA’S INTEGRATION INTO PAKISTAN—ANALYSIS 
After comprehensive military operations and extrication of terrorists from FATA, 
the demand for meaningful reforms in FATA has gained momentum; meanwhile, the 
difference of opinion on modalities for imposition of reforms remains. Pakistan 
constituted the FATA Reforms Committee in 2015 to formulate various options for the 
integration of FATA into Pakistan’s national system.177  
Before enforcing the required reform package, the committee has presented four 
options for revising the constitutional status of FATA. The first option suggests 
continuity of status quo by maintaining the semi-independent status of FATA, while only 
enforcing judicial and administrative reforms to improve FATA’s situation. According to 
the second option, the federal government would administer FATA through an elected 
governing body—the FATA Counsel. In other options, through constitutional 
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amendments, FATA would be converted into a separate administrative province or 
merged with KPK province.178 Apparently, the reform committee’s recommendations 
advocate for the merger of FATA with KPK; however, any decision on FATA’s future 
must entail detailed evaluation from Pakistan’s parliament and cabinet beside consensus 
from the FATA population.  
Various stakeholders, including FATA’s tribal elite and youth, and the political 
and administrative elite of both KPK and Pakistan, have conflicting political and socio-
economic interests relating to the proposed constitutional and administrative status of 
FATA. Amid these conflicts of interests, the supporters of these various options offer 
contradictory arguments on proposed FATA’s model. Amid continuous militancy and 
lack of economic opportunities in FATA, a significant number of people from FATA 
have moved overseas for employment.179 As a result, this segment of FATA’s society has 
attained economic independence and prosperity. The families and dependents of this 
overseas cadre are now demanding measures to change the existing nomadic order of the 
FATA. Amid this new socio-economic awareness in FATA, the traditional tribal elite—
the maliks—have also adapted to the emerging environment of change; in a bid to remain 
relevant, maliks, along with a majority of FATA’s residents, demand the granting of an 
independent provincial status to FATA.180  
The potential merger of FATA with KPK has implications for national policy 
outcomes because a larger Pashtun-province comprising KPK and FATA will nurture 
Pashtun nationalism. The option to merge FATA in KPK province has popular approval 
among the political stakeholders of KPK. With the merger of FATA into KPK, the KPK 
will emerge as a bigger province, more able to influence national politics and policy 
outcome; on the other hand, it might also contribute to Pashtun nationalism, which may 
lead to the demand of a separate state for Pushto speaking population, contrary to 
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Pakistan’s state interests. The major political stakeholders of KPK, Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI), Awami National Party (ANP), and Qaumi Watan Party (QWP), and the 
religious parties—Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)—support the 
proposal of FATA’s integration into KPK.181 The alliance of FATA’s political parties’ 
has threatened to observe August 14, Pakistan’s Independence Day, as a day of 
mourning, if the government of the Pakistan fails to merge FATA with the KPK 
province.182 The advocates of this merger refer to traditions linking FATA and KPK, as 
well as ethnic and linguistic, and social similarities between KPK and FATA.  
Contrary to the interests of the KPK’s political elite, the current Punjab-dominant 
federal government and central bureaucracy to retain its dominance does not welcome the 
proposal of FATA’s merger into KPK. The Pakistan Muslim League—presently in power 
at center, Punjab and Baluchistan—supports the management of FATA through a 
central—governing council, similar to the existing arrangements in Azad Kashmir and 
Gilgit-Baltistan.183 However, the KPK’s political parties support the merger of FATA in 
province of KPK.184 The political and administrative elite at center suspects that granting 
of provincial status to FATA may trigger the ongoing ethnic sub-nationalism already 
demanding provincial status within Punjab and Sindh provinces; Punjab province 
dominates the central politics and outcome of elections due to its huge population base. 
Additionally, central political elite fears that the merger of FATA with KPK, will enable 
the bigger KPK province to challenge the domination of Punjab in policy outcome at the 
federal level.185  
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The creation of a new FATA province will warrant establishment of an altogether 
new governance mechanism: creation of legislative, administrative, and judicial 
departments. The creation of a new province comprising FATA and establishment of a 
new governance mechanism will require vital financial resources. Current economic 
indicators suggest that the war-torn economy of Pakistan may not sustain its cost in the 
near future. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FATA’S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS 
Before enforcing administrative, political, judicial, and economic reforms, 
Pakistan’s government must abolish FCR, and rescind FATA’s special status to bring it 
to equal standing with the rest of the country. Pakistan needs to adopt constitutional and 
legal amendments either to merge FATA with KPK province or create an additional 
province comprising FATA. Subsequently, Pakistan should create various departments 
and institutions—identical to those of KPK province as discussed in Chapter V—to 
undertake their essential governance functions. These institutions, through public 
participation, need to discharge their functions to ensure implementation of law, 
transparency, and accountability. The FCR must be abolished forthwith, and the office of 
the political agents, FATA Secretariat, and Ministry of SAFRON be done away with. 
However, abruptly annulling the FCR may result in administrative chaos and breakdown 
of management apparatus.186 Therefore, the government needs to devise a comprehensive 
phased plan to install a new governance mechanism.  
The population of FATA must approve a legal framework for the administrative 
and political status of FATA, before implementation of any governance system. During 
the last four decades, the population of FATA has been subject to intense violence 
affecting almost every aspect of tribal society. The people of FATA realize that a 
comprehensive reform package is mandatory to bring the desired change in FATA; the 
survey conducted by Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP) indicates 
that a majority of the FATA population supports transformation of the existing 
management, whereas only 11 percent of people advocate continuation of the status 
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quo.187 Pakistan’s government must conduct a referendum to ascertain future 
administrative and constitutional status of FATA in accordance with the recommendation 
and choice of the local tribesmen. The conduct of the referendum in FATA will inculcate 
a sense of participation amongst the tribesmen while dissolving the imperialistic legacy 
of political non-participation. Amid finance and time constraints, the integration of 
FATA into KPK appears to be the workable and logical option; however, no outside 
decision shall be enforced on independence-conscious tribesmen. Any decision against 
the will of local people is likely to be resisted by the tribesmen and may prove 
counterproductive.  
The FATA’s merger with KPK is supported by cultural, social, and linguistic 
similarities; the suitability of KPK’s administrative mechanism; and the cost-
effectiveness of merging FATA with KPK province than that of creating a new provincial 
structure—by using existing governance structure. Pakistan must build public opinion to 
draw public support for this merger. Due to the geographical layout, FATA remains 
dependent on KPK for economic, health, education, and logistics.188 Moreover, all 
FATA’s agencies are linked with KPK through the road network. For this reason, as well, 
the integration of FATA with KPK appears more logical and practical than creating an 
altogether new province or retaining the semi-autonomous status of FATA. Therefore, it 
is recommended that FATA agencies be converted into administrative districts as part of 
KPK. These newly formed districts should be governed in line with the existing 
administrative model employed in KPK under a deputy commissioner as head of local 
administration. Besides the deputy commissioner’s office, revenue, health, education, 
social welfare, police, labor, industries, and other administrative departments should be 
established forthwith.  
                                                 





C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND 
JUDICIAL REFORMS IN FATA  
In developed and developing societies, a democratic local government system is 
essential to translate the people’s will into policies. Pakistan’s federal government must 
implement the Local Government Act of 2002 and hold elections to form local 
governance bodies at the agency, divisional, and sub-divisional level, while providing 
requisite financial and planning autonomy to these bodies.  
Despite adopting FATA’s Local Government Act of 2002, FATA’s 
administration, on one pretext or another, did not hold elections for the formation of local 
governance bodies. French theorist David Galula opines that during counterinsurgency 
campaigns the military operations help eradicate the militants’ armed threat, while local 
leaders elected through conduct of elections help win local support and deny the re-
emergence of militants.189 As a result of recent military operations, the federal 
government has restored its territorial writ over FATA. The current environment in 
FATA necessitates that the tribal administration must hold elections to establish local 
administrative governance bodies at various tiers with requisite financial and legal 
autonomy. Such arrangements will help the transition of power to the local population 
and assist their integration into the national system of Pakistan.  
In order to enhance the capacity of the existing Khassadar force, FATA’s 
administration should merge it with KPK’s police department. This merger will help to 
build the capacity of the Khassadar force to contest criminal elements in FATA. The 
Taliban hijacked the tribal society through the use of illegitimate force and money in the 
absence of any security apparatus. Effective law enforcement agencies are vital for 
implementation of governance policies and establishment of the writ of an administrative 
mechanism. The existing Khassadar Force should be merged with KPK’s police force, 
and shall be trained and equipped to meet modern policing requirements especially of 
radicalized FATA. For capacity building of law enforcement agencies the educated tribal 
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youth should be enrolled,190 and their pay packages should be raised to equal those of the 
KPK police.  
Through the application of the requisite constitutional clauses, Pakistan must 
restore the human rights of FATA’s population and repeal the enforced Action in Aid to 
Civil Power regulations. In 2011, the government enforced the Action in Aid to Civil 
Power regulation to empower the military to conduct counterinsurgency operations inside 
FATA. Substantial clauses of the Action in Aid to Civil Power regulations affect basic 
human rights and give absolute powers to the military.191 Action in Aid to Civil Power 
regulations need to be repealed forthwith as the Pakistan Army recently claimed victory 
in FATA while eradicating the Taliban menace. Annulling this controversial regulation 
will help restore human rights under the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.192  
Pakistan’s government must assist the private sector in the creation of free and 
independent media in FATA to provide FATA’s population with access to information. 
Pakistan’s government should encourage FATA’s liberal scholars and moderate clergy to 
contribute in de-radicalization using various components of media. Opinion building 
amongst the tribesmen to support any reforms package is a prelude to the integration 
process of FATA. To eradicate resistance to change and inculcate acceptance of 
modernity in FATA populace, a well-orchestrated awareness campaign should be 
conceived and executed involving educated and moderate religious scholars from 
throughout KPK.  
The 18th Amendment to Pakistan’s constitution accords information access rights 
to the people of Pakistan.193 The Print and Electric Media Regulatory Authority 
(PEMRA) monitors and regulates the development and conduct of the media.194 There is 
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a need to extend the jurisdiction of PEMRA in FATA and to establish a local media 
network that is composed of digital, electronic, and print media in FATA in the Pushto 
language and in line with tribal culture. Media must be monitored and harnessed to 
promote awareness and create acceptance for modern social patterns.  
The existing FCR-based system of political non-participation in FATA must be 
repealed. To integrate FATA into its parliamentary system, Pakistan’s federal 
government must amend the constitution to extend parliament’s legislative jurisdiction to 
FATA. To inculcate modern democratic norms, the Political Parties Act should be 
enforced in its true letter and spirit. Pakistan’s central government needs to facilitate and 
encourage all political parties of Pakistan to generate political discourse in FATA.  
Through constitutional amendments, the Pakistan government must allocate seats 
for FATA in KPK’s provincial assembly to enable local representatives to legislate for 
the creation of local government in FATA. The effects of a persistent political process in 
KPK have been encouraging; the residents of KPK have been actively involved in 
political discourse. In KPK, the 2008 elections brought into power the Secular Awami 
National Party while defeating the religion-centric Muthaidda Majlus-e-Amal,195 and 
another liberal party—Pakistan Tehrik-e-sInsaf—won the 2013 elections. The 
competition of religious and secular parties to serve the populace will help in gradual 
rehabilitation of radicalized FATA. The introduction of public participation through 
democratic means, besides integrating FATA in the national and provincial political 
system, will not only empower locals, but will inculcate the essence of democratic norms 
at the grassroots level.  
FATA’s current judicial system enables the administrative and tribal elite of 
FATA to protect its vested interests at the cost of the human rights of tribesmen. Pakistan 
requires a comprehensive legal reform package to ensure protection of human rights 
through implantation of laws in FATA. The federal government of Pakistan must to 
introduce constitutional amendments to abolish Article 247 of the constitution and extend 
the jurisdiction of lower and apex courts to all of FATA as applicable in the rest of 
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Pakistan.196 Clauses of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan need to be amended to attain 
constitutional authority in this regard. The State of Pakistan should also implement civil 
and criminal laws in FATA identical to those enforced in KPK. The government needs to 
allow FATA’s representation in the provincial assembly of KPK, and judicial legislation 
for FATA must be carried out through the provincial assembly according to the people’s 
will. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REFORMS 
IN FATA  
Unprecedented financial resources are vital for the creation of new governance, 
educational, health, industrial, energy, and communication infrastructure within FATA. 
Pakistan’s ruling elite, due to economic constraints and political and security priorities, 
has ignored FATA for more than seven decades. To sustain the recent success of military 
operations in FATA, the decline of socio-economic conditions needs to be addressed. 
Pakistan must adopt comprehensive measures to bring FATA on equal standing with the 
rest of Pakistan. Limited by meager economic resources, Pakistan must set aside all its 
development work in the rest of Pakistan—except projects related to CPEC—for two 
years and divert all funds for the integration and development of FATA. Socio-economic 
development of FATA will have a positive impact on eradication of terrorism, thereby 
restoring the image of Pakistan throughout the world. 
The local community government system, comprising elected bodies, is 
instrumental to determine educational, health, and other development requirements and 
priorities of their respective areas. Similarly, FATA’s tribesmen need to play a 
participatory role in addressing the socio-economic decline. KPK’s enforced local 
government should be extended to FATA. Elected bodies at various tiers should be given 
resources and autonomy to evaluate, plan, and supervise all socio-economic development 
projects, including education, health, and basic infrastructure projects.  
For human resources development, provision of formal and technical education to 
FATA’s youth, including women, is vital to achieve sustained economic growth and to 
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enhance employment opportunities. Besides hiring essential teaching and support staff 
for schools, new schools should be established within a manageable commuting radius 
for students. Attainment of a high school-level education should be made mandatory and 
free of cost. To reduce the financial pressure on poor tribesmen, the state should provide 
free books and meals to students. The madrassas—religious schools—should be 
registered and brought under the education department, and a standard syllabus should be 
introduced in all schools throughout FATA. Each town should establish college and 
vocational institutions both for male and female students. Moreover, each agency 
headquarters should house a university. Local government bodies should have financial 
capacity and authority to revitalize existing medical facilities and hospitals, hire medical 
staff, and procure quality medicines through a transparent procedure.  
FATA’s agriculture sector, despite employing a major percentage of FATA’s 
population, has major shortcomings: lack of irrigation facilities, collective land 
ownership, and low yield are major impediments to agricultural production. In this 
regard, communal land ownership should be abolished, and after segregation of 
commercial, residential, and agriculture lands, these lands should be re-distributed among 
each household in FATA. Due to the absence of an irrigation network, landowners are 
unable to cultivate 56 percent of the fertile land. To address this shortfall, the 
administration should ensure construction of irrigation channels, provision of electricity, 
and installation of tube wells at subsidized rates. To introduce modern agricultural 
techniques to farmers at the community level, local government should arrange seminars, 
workshops, and lectures. FATA’s farmers should be encouraged to refrain from poppy 
cultivation197 through motivation, substitute incentives, and strict law enforcement. With 
provision of requisite education, the local administration should encourage FATA’s 
youth to establish agro-based businesses, including forestry, and poultry and livestock 
rearing. The existing banking system of KPK should be extended to FATA, and FATA’s 
farmers should be entitled to draw loans on soft terms to acquire agriculture appliances, 
fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds.  
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FATA’s untapped mineral deposits have the potential to generate much needed 
finances for prosperity and development of FATA. In consultation with local 
stakeholders, government should evolve a comprehensive mechanism for extraction of 
these resources. Besides providing a royalty to FATA, the federation must allocate the 
rest of all mineral revenue for infrastructure development projects. However, for progress 
in the industry, agriculture, and mining sectors, a comprehensive communication 
infrastructure is essential. The provincial government should formulate a communication 
masterplan including roads, rail, and air, and these projects should proceed according to 
priority, following a strict timeline. Sustained electric supply is essential for economic 
and industrial growth; however, Pakistan is already subject to acute power shortages. The 
rugged and mountainous terrain of FATA poses a particular challenge to establish power 
transmission infrastructure. Therefore, small and medium hydroelectric projects in each 
agency should be constructed to meet the energy requirements. 
No society can develop and face modern governance challenges without strong 
revenue generation to meet administrative and development expenditures, and FATA is 
no exception. FATA’s economy is undocumented, with no tax collection mechanism in 
place. The government should extend KPK’s revenue generation and tax collection 
mechanism to FATA; trade, business, and other economic activities should be registered, 
documented, and brought into the taxation network. However, in order to promote 
economic activities in FATA, the newly established agriculture and industrial units 
should be granted tax holidays for a certain period. Government should enforce strict 
measures to control illegal businesses like drug handling, weapons manufacturing, and 
smuggling of contraband items. A comprehensive border control mechanism is 
mandatory to effectively monitor illegal trade and to collect excise duties; therefore, 
modern means of surveillance, communication, and transportation should be provided to 
the border management force to control crossing through the porous Durand Line. 
Traditionally, the absence of an accountability mechanism and the nexus of 
political agents and maliks in FATA has led to corruption, political exploitation, and 
nepotism; it has also proved detrimental to the socio-economic development of FATA. In 
order to prevent financial malpractice, all development projects need to be monitored and 
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supervised to ensure judicious utilization of funds for bona fide purposes. Government 
should establish independent monitoring bodies comprising elected members of the 
respective community and government officials to address these audit and transparency 
issues.  
 Furthermore, extension of CPEC toward Afghanistan and CARs depends on 
stability in Afghanistan and FATA. The CPEC project has already initiated significant 
economic activities in KPK’s areas adjacent to FATA, and CPEC’s subsequent extension 
toward Afghanistan and CARs will generate huge economic opportunities for FATA, and 
certainly assist in poverty reduction. The economic development prospects of CPEC will 
likely induce Afghanistan to pursue better relations with Pakistan.198 Therefore, the 
political and security elite of Pakistan-KPK and FATA, both at the national and 
provincial levels, should negotiate and find solutions to all security and political 
impediments obstructing the CPEC’s westward expansion through FATA toward 
Afghanistan and CARs.  
At the international level, Pakistan should highlight the economic significance of 
the CPEC in FATA’s integration in Pakistan’s national mainstream, combating terrorism, 
extremism, and separatism. The false perception of CPEC as a Sino-Pak alliance to 
challenge U.S. and Indian interests in the region needs to be clarified; as Feroz Hassan 
Khan highlights, “In fact, the partnership is no more than a classic manifestation of 
neorealism in international relations.”199 Pakistan should endeavor to involve India and 
the United States as regional and global stakeholders to expand the corridor toward India, 
Afghanistan, and CARs to help Pakistan integrate FATA into its mainstream through 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan must exploit the emerging regional security and economic situation 
existing after 9/11 and GWOT. The rise of TTP in FATA challenged the existence of the 
Pakistan’s ideological and constitutional existence. These security challenges prompted 
military operations inside FATA, fueled by moral, military, and financial support from 
the international community. The Pakistan Army claims that after having flushed the 
Taliban out of FATA, including the internationally controversial and allegedly security 
establishment-sponsored Haqqanis network,200 it is now engaged in combing operations 
across the country against underground and sleeper cells of the Taliban.201 Owing to the 
destruction of the command and control structures of the Taliban, the security situation in 
Pakistan continues to improve significantly, and there has been a manifold reduction in 
violence. In 2015, the number of the TTP’s attacks was the lowest since its formation in 
2007.202 
The IDPs, due to military operations in FATA, are now returning from 
government-organized temporary camps to their native areas in FATA.203 This 
meaningful rehabilitation process in FATA demands that the civilian government not 
only launch the much-awaited control mechanism but must also create conditions for 
implementation of Pakistan’s effective control apparatus by building public support and 
political will. The monster of terrorism that was bred and nurtured in FATA has isolated 
Pakistan and defamed the Pakistani image internationally and domestically. During the 
last two decades, it has cost tens of thousands of lives and huge financial resources to 
restore Pakistan’s writ in FATA. Pakistan, in consultation with the United States and 
other regional stakeholders, must expedite its efforts to establish the long-awaited peace 
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in the FATA and Afghanistan. The decades-old civil war has not only destabilized FATA 
and Afghanistan, but it also has far-reaching effects on the region’s peace and economic 
uplift. 
Pakistan also must undertake concrete measures to rehabilitate the Taliban that 
was sponsored by multiple states—Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
Afghanistan—and created to fight the U.S.S.R during the Cold War. President Pervez 
Musharraf highlighted that “we helped create the mujahedeen, fired them with religious 
zeal in seminaries, armed them, paid them, and sent them to a jihad against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan. We did not stop to think how we would divert them to productive 
life after the jihad was won.”204  
Ironically, 70 years ago, had Pakistan’s ruling elite taken appropriate 
constitutional measures to integrate FATA, the violence, lawlessness, and deprivations of 
tribesmen might have been addressed. The improved security situation and eviction of 
Taliban from FATA provides an opportunity to Pakistan to consolidate its gains and 
integrate FATA into its state system. Pakistan must absorb FATA into its state system 
through constitutional amendments, before it becomes too late and the Taliban re-
emerges to challenge the state in settled areas of Pakistan yet again. 
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APPENDIX. AN OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE 
According to article 50 of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, Pakistan’s parliament 
consists of the National Assembly, lower house, and the Senate, upper house. Parliament 
can legislate on any matter; however, the National Assembly exclusively handles bills 
related to financial aspects only.205 Members of the National Assembly are directly 
elected for a term of five years through adult franchise; these members then elect the 
prime minister—the head of the government.206 The members of the provincial 
assemblies elect the senators. The president, as the head of the state, is directly elected by 
the parliament and acts on the advice of the prime minister. The National Assembly is an 
independent legislative house that proposes and creates laws for the federation through 
discussions, adjournment motions, questions, and standing committees on various 
subjects. The opposition parties ensure that the government adheres to the constitution 
while administering the governing function. The Speaker, who is assisted by 46 standing 
committees, including Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Commerce, runs the 
National Assembly. The provinces are allotted seats in the National Assembly in 
proportion to their population. The current distribution by province of National Assembly 
members is given in Table 8. 
Table 8.   Distribution of Seats in National Assembly of Pakistan by 
Province.207 
Type  Baluchistan KPK Punjab Sindh FATA Federal Capital Total 
General 14 35 148 61 12 2 272 
Women 03 08 35 14 - - 60 
Minority - - - - - - 10 
Total 17 43 183 75 12 2 342 
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As parliament’s upper house, the Senate plays a significant role to ensure national 
harmony. The Chairman of Senate conducts the business of the house with the help of 42 
standing committees on various government aspects. The current strength of the Senate is 
100 members, and each province has equal representation in the Senate.208 The allocation 
of seats, by province, in the Senate is given in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Distribution of Seats in the Senate of Pakistan by Province.209 
Administrative Unit General Seats Reserved Women Seats Technocrats Total
Federal Capital 2 1 1 4 
Baluchistan 14 4 4 22 
KPK 14 4 4 22 
Punjab 14 4 4 22 
Sindh 14 4 4 22 
FATA 8 - - 8 
Total 66 17 17 100 
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